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721 
REBUTTING THE ROBERTS COURT: 
REINVENTING THE COLLATERAL ORDER 
DOCTRINE THROUGH JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING  
A civil procedure revival has quietly been underway since the inception 
of the Roberts Court in 2005.
1
 Unnoticed and sweeping changes may be in 
the works following the “dramatic theoretical and doctrinal shifts”2 
resulting from the Court’s rulings in more than twenty cases concerning 
core areas of civil procedure.
3
 Even considering the civil procedure 
revolution that has gone largely undetected, far less attention has been 
drawn to the Roberts Court’s decisions interpreting the Court’s role in 
determining the scope of the collateral order doctrine.
4
 The significance is 
practical as well as theoretical because the Court’s redefined role in 
shaping the collateral order doctrine has a direct effect on the immediate 
 
 
 1. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. 
LITIG. 313, 314 (2012) (citing Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT 
OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx). See also id. at 315–16 
(suggesting that “having civil procedure on the doctrinal agenda will not draw the attention or ire of 
the popular media or the public . . . . Indeed, it may not draw the attention of many beyond the civil 
procedure professoriate, and even then only with a modicum of sarcasm” but noting the importance of 
the Court’s “re-engagement with civil procedure”). Blogger Amy Howe, reporting on the Court’s 
decision in Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011), demonstrated the principal reason that such 
doctrinal changes have gone unnoticed. Howe reported that Justice Kagan introduced the case by 
calling it a “complicated procedural ruling,” but translated Justice Kagan’s introduction as: “if you 
understand anything I say, you have a law degree AND you had your cup of coffee.” Howard 
Wasserman, Federal Procedure Day at the Supreme Court, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 16, 2011, 12:16 
PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/federal-procedure-day-at-the-supreme-court 
.html (describing SCOTUSBlogger Amy Howe’s reporting on the Court’s treatment of Smith).  
 2. Wasserman, The Roberts Court, supra note 1, at 318. 
 3. See id. at 314–15 (summarizing the cases as those concerning, “pleading, summary 
judgment, relation back of amended pleadings, personal jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, 
diversity jurisdiction, jurisdictionality, removal procedure, class actions, civil representation, 
arbitration of civil and civil rights claims in lieu of litigation, appealability, remedies, and the Erie–
Hanna doctrine” and suggesting these cases “have been significant and potentially far-reaching”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 4. The collateral order doctrine operates as a limited exception to the final judgment rule. See 
generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 15A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3911 (2d ed. 
1992). Generally, this rule forces litigants to wait for the court to enter a final judgment before either 
litigant may appeal any of the trial court’s rulings in the case. See generally id. § 3907. In Cohen v. 
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the Supreme Court created the collateral order doctrine, holding that 
those orders which “finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted 
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that 
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). As 
such, those orders that qualify as collateral orders allow litigants to circumvent the strict requirements 
of the final judgment rule and bring an immediate appeal of certain orders issued by the trial court 
during the course of the trial. See id.  
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appealability of pre-judgment orders issued in both civil and criminal 
cases on a daily basis.  
To put the significance of the issue in context, imagine yourself as the 
attorney for an allegedly wrongfully terminated employee.
5
 A district court 
has ordered you to disclose information concerning your client’s 
pre-termination interview with his previous employer’s attorney. You 
opposed such a disclosure on grounds of attorney-client privilege but were 
overruled. Considering the dilemma, you can identify only a few courses 
of action.
6
  
First, you could disclose the information. That approach, however, may 
not only adversely affect your client but also constitute an ethical violation 
for a breach of the attorney-client privilege. Second, you could refuse to 
disclose the information. This course would certainly justify the court in 
issuing both a contempt order and sanctions.
7
 Third, you could 
immediately appeal the disclosure order. There are various methods to 
pursue an immediate appeal; none of them, however, are likely to work.  
In an increasingly small number of cases, an immediate appeal may be 
allowed under the certification procedures outlined in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b).
8
 Under the certification procedure you would first have to 
persuade the district court to certify the issue, by showing the appeal 
would involve “‘a controlling question of law’ the prompt resolution of 
which ‘may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation.’”9 Even then, you still must persuade the court of appeals to 
accept the appeal. An alternative route to an immediate appeal would be to 
attempt the herculean task of showing such an extraordinary circumstance 
of manifest injustice to persuade the court of appeals to issue a writ of 
mandamus.
10
  
The last method of securing an immediate appeal is available only if 
the adverse disclosure order fell within “that small class” of cases that are 
exempted from the final judgment rule—those non-final orders qualifying 
as elite members of the collateral order doctrine.
11
 Although the Supreme 
 
 
 5. This scenario is based on the facts of Mohawk Indus., Inc., v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103–
05 (2009). 
 6. The potential courses of action are based on the “several potential avenues of review apart 
from collateral order appeal” identified by Justice Sotomayor in Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 110–12. 
 7. Id. at 111. 
 8. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
 9. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 110–11 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). 
 10. See id. at 111 (noting that mandamus is reserved for “extraordinary circumstances”) 
(referencing Cheney v. United States Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 390 (2004)). 
 11. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/7
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Court has determined that a public official may immediately appeal an 
order denying his immunity defense,
12
 the Court has slammed the door on 
attempts to immediately appeal an adverse disclosure order.
13
  
This hypothetical situation frequently occurs in courts throughout the 
country. The obvious hardship of a wrongfully imposed disclosure order 
coupled with the difficulty and unpredictability of securing an immediate 
appeal leaves both the attorney and the client in an unnecessarily 
precarious position. The question has been asked before,
14
 but is worth 
asking again: why does our judicial system tolerate delayed appellate 
review of non-final orders, such as disclosure orders, but allow immediate 
appellate review of other orders, such as those concerning immunity 
defenses? The Court has provided a variety of attempted explanations and 
clarifications of its finality jurisprudence and the scope of the collateral 
order doctrine since its inception in 1949.
15
 But only recently—under the 
Roberts Court’s civil procedure revolution—has the Court resorted to 
invoking its rulemaking authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(c) and 1292(e) 
to steadfastly reject any novel attempts to expand the contours of the 
collateral order doctrine.
16
 
In Mohawk Industries, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its principled 
refusal to expand the list of immediately appealable non-final orders.
17
 The 
Court rested its conclusion on an interpretation that Sections 1292(e) and 
2072(c) were designed as statutory limitations to prevent judicial 
expansion of the collateral order doctrine.
18
 The Court mistakenly used the 
statutes as a shield, defying both legislative history and prudential 
concerns.
19
 Instead, the Court should articulate a more flexible, balanced 
approach to the Cohen conditions
20—emphasizing the implicit similarities 
 
 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 54–59. 
 13. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 109. 
 14. Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1255–56 
(2007) (asking why immediate review of a denied res judicata defense based on a prior judgment or 
settlement is barred, but immediate review of a denial of qualified immunity is allowed). 
 15. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 16. See Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 113–14. 
 17. See id. at 114. 
 18. See id. at 113 (“[W]e reiterate that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain 
‘narrow and selective in its membership.’ This admonition has acquired special force in recent years 
with the enactment of legislation designating rulemaking, ‘not expansion by court decision,’ as the 
preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment orders should be immediately 
appealable.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 19. See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
 20. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Supreme Court has 
interpreted the language from Cohen—limiting the collateral order doctrine to those orders which 
“finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too 
important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to the standards of relief for a preliminary injunction—that would 
inevitably expand, through judicial decision-making, the currently settled, 
strict confines of the collateral order doctrine.
21
 
This Note will focus on the Court’s invocation of its rulemaking 
authority under Sections 1292(e) and 2072(c), specifically analyzing the 
merits of the Court’s use of this authority as a shield to any attempted 
expansion of the collateral order doctrine. Part I provides a contextual 
background of the collateral order doctrine, tracking its trajectory of 
judicial expansion and contraction as an exception to the final judgment 
rule. Part II reviews the legislative history of Congress’s grant of 
rulemaking authority to the Court and argues the Court is mistaken to 
interpret these sources as support for a bar on judicial expansion of the 
collateral order doctrine. Part III examines the codification of Rule 23(f) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to explain how the collateral order 
doctrine is unsuited for codification as a federal rule and argues the Court 
should refrain from invoking its rulemaking authority even though 
Congress has granted it. Finally, Part IV proposes the collateral order 
doctrine is best understood and most useful as a flexible standard.  
I. AN EXCEPTION TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE: THE HISTORY OF THE 
COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE FROM JUDICIAL INVENTION TO A 
DORMANT RULEMAKING AUTHORITY 
A. The Final Judgment Rule 
“Do you have a final decision?”22 Judge Aldisert posed this question to 
appellate litigators in his chapter on jurisdiction in Winning on Appeal.
23
 
Section 1291 of the United States Code grants jurisdiction to federal 
appellate courts “from all final decisions of the district courts . . . except 
 
 
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”—as creating separate “Cohen 
conditions” that must be independently satisfied for an order to fall within the scope of the collateral 
order doctrine. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468–69 & n.10 (1978) (quoting Cohen, 
337 U.S. at 546). The first of these “Cohen conditions” requires that the decision “conclusively 
determine the disputed question.” Id. at 468. Second, the decision must “resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the [underlying] action.” Id. And third, the decision must “be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Id. The Court has also suggested that there 
are four Cohen conditions rather than three because it has emphasized that the right to be reviewed 
must have independently sufficient “importance.” See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
511 U.S. 863, 878 (1994); see also discussion infra Part I.A–B. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 22. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS & ORAL ARGUMENT 43 
(1992). 
 23. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/7
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where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”24 The Supreme 
Court has described a final decision as one that “ends the litigation on the 
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,”25 
or similarly, those decisions that “trigger the entry of judgment.”26 
Because the final judgment rule has been the “heart of appellate 
jurisdiction in the federal system” for over two centuries, Judge Aldisert 
sensibly presented this as his first question to litigators considering 
bringing an appeal.
27
 
The policy justifications for the final judgment rule are, in a broad 
sense, matters of judicial efficiency and preservation of the traditional trial 
process.
28
 Preventing piecemeal litigation is often seen as a means of 
promoting judicial efficiency and respecting the traditional role of the trial 
judge.
29
 According to this rationale, the cost of a wrong decision by a trial 
judge is typically outweighed by either the benefit provided by 
uninterrupted trial proceedings or the assurance that the issue is adequately 
reviewable through alternatives to an immediate appeal.
30
 The Supreme 
Court has also expressed a fear that immediate appealability of non-final 
orders may be used as a harassment tool by a litigant seeking to increase 
the time and cost of litigation at the expense of the opposing party.
31
 
The final judgment rule, however, also has flaws. In its attempt to 
strike a balance between efficient judicial administration, deference to the 
lower courts, and litigant protection, the final judgment rule often 
produces a disparate impact on parties. Judge Aldisert recognized such an 
 
 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 25. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 497 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). 
 26. Mohawk Indus., Inc., v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009). 
 27. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, § 3907. 
 28. See id. (“[C]ourts speak of ‘efficiency,’ protecting the role of the trial judge, and the need to 
avoid such evils as interference with the trial court, deciding unnecessary issues, and deliberate delay 
or harassment”). 
 29. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106 (“Permitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals, we 
have recognized, undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’ and encroaches upon the prerogatives 
of district court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (“Permitting piecemeal 
appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that 
individual plays in our judicial system.”); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (“To 
be effective, judicial administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by 
permitting separate reviews of the component elements in a unified cause.”). 
 30. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 110–12 (suggesting that parties may seek certification via 
§ 1292(b), petition the appellate court for a writ of mandamus, or defy the court’s order and incur 
whatever sanctions may result). 
 31. See Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325. See also Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order 
Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 542 
(1998) (contending the final judgment rule protects litigants with the stronger claim from delay by a 
weaker litigant). 
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impact and advised practitioners accordingly: “If it appears that you lack 
finality, argue the justice side. If it appears that your opponent has 
prematurely brought an appeal, argue the inconvenience and costs of 
piecemeal review side.”32 Based on these concerns, the 1949 Supreme 
Court addressed the practical effects of the balance struck by the final 
judgment rule—in favor of deference and efficiency. The Court invented 
the collateral order doctrine to shift that balance. 
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine’s Inception as a Judicial Invention 
The Supreme Court, recognizing the hardships occasionally resulting 
from the final judgment rule,
33
 carved out an exception to the rule when it 
decided Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
34
 In that case, the Court 
held that a district court’s ruling that it was not bound to apply a state law 
requiring the plaintiffs in a shareholder derivative action to post a bond 
before proceeding to trial was immediately appealable.
35
 In reaching its 
decision, the Court gave the term “final disposition” a practical rather than 
strictly technical definition—and, in doing so, invented the collateral order 
doctrine.
36
 It reasoned that this decision fell into “that small class” of cases 
which warrant an exception from the final judgment rule because it 
“finally determine[d] claims of right separable from, and collateral to, 
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too 
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be 
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”37  
 
 
 32. ALDISERT, supra note 22, at 43–44. 
 33. Congress has also recognized that the costs of not allowing an immediate appeal of a judicial 
error will sometimes outweigh the benefits provided by uninterrupted litigation. In response, Congress 
has provided for interlocutory appellate review of matters involving injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1) (2006). Additionally, Congress enacted a certification procedure by which a trial judge 
may certify an order not otherwise appealable if it “involves a controlling question of law as to which 
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may 
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). Under this 
procedure, the certified non-final order is still subject to discretionary approval or disapproval by the 
appellate court. Id. Finally, Congress provided another escape clause to the final judgment rule under 
the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2006). While a writ of mandamus avoids the final judgment 
rule, the Supreme Court has instructed that “only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial 
‘usurpation of power’ will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” Will v. United States, 
389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967). For a general overview of congressionally authorized interlocutory appeals, 
see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 4, at § 3920 and GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§§ 15.11–15.13 (6th ed. 2011).  
 34. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 35. Id. at 544–47.  
 36. See id. at 546. See also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) (“That term, the 
Court held, was to be given a ‘practical rather than a technical construction.’”). 
 37. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/7
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This decision, and the other “small class” of cases exempted from the 
final judgment rule were now members of the collateral order doctrine. 
Subsequent courts broke the broad formulation devised by the Supreme 
Court into three—sometimes four—separate conditions that a litigant must 
satisfy before an appellate court may immediately review a non-final 
order.
38
  
The first of these “Cohen conditions” is the decision must 
“conclusively determine the disputed question.”39 Second, the decision 
must “resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of 
the [underlying] action.”40 And third, the decision must “be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”41 Some courts have 
redefined the collateral order doctrine as encompassing four conditions—
splitting the second condition into two separate requirements: that the 
issue be “important” and that the issue be distinct from the underlying 
merits.
42
 
The Court decided Cohen—and invented the collateral order doctrine—
in 1949.
43
 For nearly three decades after that decision the Court embraced 
a hands-off approach to its judicial invention, allowing the lower courts to 
flesh out the contours of the doctrine.
44
 In 1978, however, the Court 
 
 
 38. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468–69 (1978) (delineating, for the first 
time, three separate conditions from Cohen’s general formulation). 
 39. Id. at 468. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See United States v. Sorren, 605 F.2d 1211, 1213 (1st Cir. 1979) (deriving “[f]our requisites 
of appealability” from the Cohen opinion). 
 43. Adam Steinman provides a useful overview of the practical procedures involved with the 
collateral order doctrine:  
 Because the collateral order doctrine provides an appeal as of right, a litigant invoking it 
must simply file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal states only the parties who are 
appealing, the judgment or order being appealed, and the court to which the appeal is being 
taken. The notice of appeal does not even need to specify that the collateral order doctrine is 
the basis for appellate jurisdiction. Unless the party opposing the appeal files a preliminary 
motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the appeal will proceed to full briefing on 
the merits as well as on the appellate court's jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional issue will not 
be resolved until full briefing is complete. A notice of appeal must be filed within the time 
limits set by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, which, for civil appeals, is typically 
thirty days after the district court enters the order being appealed. 
Steinman, supra note 14, at 1252 (internal footnotes omitted).  
 44. Scholars agree that the Supreme Court took a hands-off approach during this period, but 
disagree on whether the doctrine was liberally or strictly applied. Compare Anderson, supra note 31, 
at 548 (finding the early years after Cohen to be a period of strict constructionism for the doctrine with 
the Court “fail[ing] to be explicit about it”), with Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and 
Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 740 (1993) 
(“For two decades the Supreme Court did not interfere with the liberal use of the collateral order 
doctrine.”). 
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intervened in Coopers & Lybrand to provide a clear delineation of the 
separate Cohen conditions.
45
 This initial involvement triggered a period of 
heightened Supreme Court interest in attempting to provide clarity to its 
judicially invented, final judgment exception.
46
 
C. The Collateral Order Doctrine’s Expansion and Contraction as a 
Judicial Tool 
Although the collateral order doctrine developed in two different 
contexts—civil and criminal—the trajectory of the doctrine in each 
context followed a similar path. After its inception in Cohen and 
reformulation in Coopers & Lybrand, the doctrine went through periods of 
both expansion and contraction. In the beginning, this judicial tool 
infrequently returned to its inventors’ desks—the Supreme Court 
discussed the doctrine in only four cases between 1949 and 1974.
47
 Once 
the Court expanded the contours of the doctrine, however, creative 
appellate litigators began exploring potential paths around the thorny 
confines of the final judgment rule.
48
 
From 1974 to 1988, the Court decided whether certain non-final orders 
could be immediately appealed approximately once per year.
49
 The 
frequency of the issue commanding the Court’s attention was a result of its 
own muddling of the parameters of the doctrine, which encouraged 
litigators to push the limits in the lower courts.
50
 Although the Court 
selectively expanded the collateral order doctrine, the dominant result was 
a narrowing approach. That is, the Court denied most attempts to carve out 
further exceptions to the final judgment rule by expanding the scope of the 
collateral order doctrine.  
 
 
 45. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (“To come within the ‘small class’ 
of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine 
the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and 
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”).  
 46. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided twenty-seven appellate jurisdiction cases 
dealing with an interlocutory order issue between 1980 and 1990. See Steinman, supra note 14, at 
1296–97 (providing a table of “Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Cases Since 1980”). 
 47. See Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542, 549 
(1963); Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 519 (1956); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951); Swift 
& Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 688–89 (1950). 
 48. Theodore D. Frank, Comment, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REV. 292, 
317–18 (1966) (exploring the negative implications of the rise of the collateral order doctrine as an 
exception to the final judgment rule and concluding that “[l]awyers unsure of the finality of the 
decision” will file more frequent appeals). 
 49. Anderson, supra note 31, at 581 (“[D]uring the era of expansion from 1974 to 1988, the issue 
commanded the Court's attention fourteen times, or once a year.”). 
 50. See id. at 576; Frank, supra note 48, at 317–18. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss3/7
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In both the civil and criminal context, the greatest expansion of the 
doctrine was the result of different orders relating to the applicability of 
immunity defenses reaching the Supreme Court. For example, from 
Helstoski v. Meanor
51
 in 1979 to Osborn v. Haley
52
 in 2007, the Court has 
held that six different immunities qualify as immediately appealable 
collateral orders:
53
 immunity under the Speech or Debate clause,
54
 
executive absolute immunity,
55
 judicial immunity,
56
 qualified immunity,
57
 
state sovereign immunity,
58
 and Westfall Act immunity for a federal 
employee.
59
 Generally, the Court reasoned that these different defenses, 
each of which invokes immunity from a specific source, embody a right 
not to stand trial.
60
 As a result, a trial court’s order denying immunity to 
suit is essentially unreviewable on appeal because the immunity from suit 
“is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial” against 
the immune official.
61
 
Although the collateral order doctrine has been selectively expanded to 
include those orders generally affecting a litigant’s right not to stand 
trial—principally in the immunity context—the trend has been to narrowly 
confine the doctrine.
62
 The Court drew a limit on its expansionist strand of 
right-not-to-stand-trial collateral orders in Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser.
63
 
That case was brought in a New York federal district court against an 
Italian owner of a cruise ship that was hijacked in the Mediterranean.
64
 
 
 
 51. 442 U.S. 500 (1979). 
 52. 549 U.S. 225 (2007). 
 53. See Aaron R. Petty, The Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 
383–84 (2010); see generally Steinman, supra note 14, at 1250, 1296 (describing instances where 
court orders affecting immunity have been immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine).  
 54. See Helstoski, 442 U.S. at 506–08. 
 55. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 743 (1982). 
 56. See Claiborne v. United States, 465 U.S. 1305, 1305–06 (1984). 
 57. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding that a ruling denying summary 
judgment when a qualified-immunity defense is raised is sometimes appealable). But see Johnson v. 
Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 317–18 (1995) (clarifying Mitchell, holding that a trial court’s summary 
judgment decision involving an issue of the sufficiency of the evidence is not immediately appealable 
simply because the underlying action involves a qualified-immunity defense); Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. 
Ct. 884, 889 (2011) (holding that, after a full trial on the merits, an order denying a motion for 
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not immediately appealable). 
 58. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993). 
 59. See Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 238–39 (2007). 
 60. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525 (classifying the issue before the Court as whether “qualified 
immunity shares this essential attribute of absolute immunity” as an “entitlement not to stand trial 
under certain circumstances”).  
 61. Id. at 526. 
 62. See Steinman, supra note 14, at 1250 (stating that “the Supreme Court has rejected the use of 
the collateral order doctrine” in most other cases outside the immunity context). 
 63. 490 U.S. 495 (1989). 
 64. Id. at 496. 
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The passengers’ tickets included a forum-selection clause intended to 
obligate passengers to initiate any suit in connection with the cruise in 
Naples, Italy.
65
 When the suit was brought in the New York federal district 
court, the ship owner filed a motion to dismiss.
66
 The district court denied 
his motion, and the ship owner attempted to immediately appeal that 
decision.
67
 The appellate court, however, denied his immediate appeal, 
reasoning that the district court’s order did not fall within the Cohen 
collateral order doctrine.
68
  
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision, carefully 
distinguishing the right not to stand trial and the right not to stand trial in a 
particular forum.
69
 The Court invoked the third prong of the collateral 
order doctrine—the effective unreviewability of the order—and decided 
the ship owner’s claim was “adequately vindicable” in an appellate court, 
in spite of the acknowledgement that it would not be “perfectly secured by 
appeal after final judgment.”70 The Court, however, failed to explain in 
what ways the appellate court could adequately vindicate the ship owner’s 
right.
71
 Additionally, the Court failed to explain at what point a right that 
is not “perfectly secured by appeal after final judgment” may cross the 
unannounced threshold and enter the not “adequately vindicable” arena. In 
doing so, the Court left the following question unanswered: at what point 
is a right that is not perfectly secured by appeal after a final judgment not 
also sufficiently vindicable on appeal to warrant an immediate appeal? 
When considering the initial rationale for embracing the right not to 
stand trial in the collateral order doctrine, the distinction the Court drew 
between the right not to stand trial and the right not to stand trial in a 
particular forum appears to be a distinction without a difference. Claims of 
immunity are designed to protect a party from standing trial and bearing 
the burdens of litigation.
72
 Similarly, a forum-selection clause is intended 
to provide certainty and convenience to the party who most valued the 
determined forum, presumably in acknowledgement of the burdens of 
litigation that party would face in a non-selected forum.
73
 And thus, since 
 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 497. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 501. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Anderson, supra note 31, at 584. 
 72. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 73. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) and M/S Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) for the Supreme Court’s determinations as to the validity and 
purpose of forum-selection clauses. 
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the Court purports to consider the interests protected by the denied 
defense—in both cases, the burdens of litigation—in determining whether 
the right is effectively unreviewable on appeal, the distinction drawn in 
Lauro Lines appears contradictory. A natural reaction to such a 
contradiction is to call into question the relevance of the standard to 
determine whether the right is effectively unreviewable or the third Cohen 
condition itself.  
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia provided an alternative rationale to 
reach the same conclusion, arguing the second prong of the collateral order 
doctrine
74
 should be bifurcated into separate “important” and “separable 
from the merits” conditions.75 Under that formulation, the distinction 
between the right not to stand trial and the right not to stand trial in a 
particular forum was warranted, he argued, because the ship owner’s right 
to choose the forum is “not sufficiently important to overcome the policies 
militating against interlocutory appeals.”76 Presumably, those policies 
must have tipped in favor of protecting the right not to stand trial in the 
immunity context.
77
  
Interestingly, Justice Scalia confronted the contradiction identified in 
the majority’s rationale by acknowledging that the ship owner’s right “is 
not fully vindicated—indeed, to be utterly frank, is positively destroyed—
by permitting the trial to occur and reversing its outcome.”78 Justice Scalia 
himself recognized the lack of meaning in the Court’s distinction because 
in both cases—in substance—the right could not be wholly vindicated on 
appeal. For Justice Scalia, the difference in “importance” between the right 
to not stand trial in a non-preferred venue and the right to not stand trial at 
all provides a meaningful distinction and warrants that the former is 
 
 
 74. Note also, Justice Scalia rested his concurrence analysis on the second Cohen condition, 
rather than the third Cohen condition that guided the majority’s analysis. See Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. 
495 at 502–03. 
 75. Id. at 502 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). The 
Court in Coopers & Lybrand lumped together the “importance” of the issue and the severability of the 
issue from the merits of the action as a single requirement—the second Cohen condition. See Coopers 
& Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). In Lauro Lines, however, Justice Scalia noted that 
the caveat that the issue be “too important to be denied review” was a “significant requirement” that 
“must” be involved in order for an order to qualify for immediate appeal.” Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 
502 (internal citations omitted). Because Justice Scalia emphasized—and only analyzed—whether the 
issue was too important to be denied review, Justice Scalia suggested that the second Cohen condition 
consists of two separate requirements: that the issue have the requisite “importance” and that it be 
separable from the merits of the underlying action. 
 76. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 503. 
 77. I assert this presumption because Justice Scalia did not suggest his proposed focus on the 
“importance” of the right would call into question any of the previous Cohen exceptions the Court 
recognized in the immunity line of cases.  
 78. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 502–03. 
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“vindicat[ed] enough” at the appellate stage.79 As a result, Justice Scalia’s 
rationale seems to answer the question left unanswered by the majority: a 
right—neither perfectly secured by appeal nor sufficiently vindicable on 
appeal—warrants inclusion as a Cohen exception when it is “sufficiently 
important to overcome the policies militating against interlocutory 
appeals.”80 
Only a few years later, Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the second 
prong of the collateral order doctrine consisted of two separate 
requirements—with much of the analysis focusing on the “importance” of 
the right asserted—became the majority opinion in Digital Equipment 
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.
81
 In Digital, the Court was asked to decide 
whether the “right not to stand trial” line of cases provided a basis for an 
immediate appeal of a lower court’s order vacating a dismissal predicated 
on a settlement agreement between the parties.
82
 The Court refused to 
broaden that line of cases, holding that “rights under private settlement 
agreements can be adequately vindicated on appeal from final 
judgment.”83 Only a few years after Lauro Lines, one would expect the 
Court to have analyzed the case under the distinction they drew between 
the right to not stand trial at all and the right not to stand trial in a 
particular forum. But the Court in Digital focused on the importance of the 
right asserted, going so far as to characterize the issue as “the bone of the 
fiercest contention in the case.”84 Adding to the confusion, the Court 
condemned Digital’s position that it was irrelevant whether the issue is 
“important,” and declared that the third Cohen condition “simply cannot 
be answered without a judgment about the value of the interests that would 
be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement.”85 
Now, the “importance” of the right asserted may be both a dispositive 
inquiry into both the second and third Cohen conditions.
86
 
 
 
 79. Id. at 503. 
 80. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Scalia also cited Abney v. United States, for the proposition that 
“importance” means the right “would be ‘lost, probably irreparably,’ if review had to await final 
judgment.” Id. at 502 (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977)). 
 81. 511 U.S. 863 (1994). 
 82. Id. at 865. 
 83. Id. at 869. 
 84. Id. at 878. 
 85. Id. at 878–79. 
 86. While it is clear that the Court emphatically embraced Justice Scalia’s suggestion that 
“importance” be a critical component of the Cohen analysis, it is unclear whether the “importance” of 
the right should be considered under the third condition, as the court in Digital suggested, or whether it 
should be considered under the second condition, as Justice Scalia in Lauro Lines suggested. 
Unfortunately, the text from Cohen is equally ambiguous, as the “too important to be denied review” 
language is sandwiched between both the second and third Cohen conditions. Cohen v. Beneficial 
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Unlike in Lauro Lines, the Court provided some guidance as to whether 
an asserted right has enough “importance” to warrant immediate review by 
an appellate court. The Court explained that “[w]here statutory and 
constitutional rights are concerned, ‘irretrievabl[e] los[s]’ can hardly be 
trivial,” i.e., constitutional and statutory rights will almost universally 
satisfy the “importance” requirement.87 On the other hand, privately 
conferred rights, such as rights embodied in a settlement agreement or a 
forum-selection clause, are not sufficiently important to overcome the 
policies militating against immediate appealability.
88
 The Court explicitly 
pointed to the policy of the final judgment rule to “avoid piecemeal 
litigation,” and declared that such a policy should not be “trumped 
routinely by the expectations or clever drafting of private parties.”89  
But the Court only weighed the value of allowing immediate appeals of 
privately conferred rights against the policy of avoiding piecemeal 
litigation,
90
 and the disruptiveness it would cause to the “orderly 
administration of justice.”91 Of course, there are countervailing benefits of 
allowing the immediate appeal.
92
 For example, a court could conserve 
sparse judicial resources by allowing an immediate appeal if the 
alternative is conducting a full trial that is eventually vacated on appeal 
due to the lower court’s erroneous ruling as to the settlement agreement.  
While the Court struggled to define the contours of the collateral order 
doctrine and the precise role of “importance” in the analysis, the Federal 
Courts Study Committee filed their Report on April 2, 1990.
93
 The Report 
 
 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (“[S]eparable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in 
the action [which is the second condition], too important to be denied review and too independent of 
the cause itself . . . .” [which is the third condition]) (emphasis added). 
 87. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 879 (1994) (alteration in original) 
(citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984) and United States ex rel. Milwaukee 
Social Democratic Public Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437–38 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). The 
Court also suggested that rights “more deeply rooted in public policy” are more likely to be 
immediately appealable. Digital, 511 U.S. at 884. The Court, however, failed to identify which rights 
are rooted in public policy, other than suggesting it includes those constitutional and statutory rights 
previously discussed. See id. 
 88. For example, in Justice Scalia’s concurrence, he concluded that the right not to stand trial in a 
particular forum embodied in a forum selection clause between private parties was not “sufficiently 
important to overcome the policies militating against interlocutory appeals.” Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 
502–03. 
 89. Digital, 511 U.S. at 879–80.  
   90. Id. at 879. 
 91. Id. at 884. 
 92. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 589–90 (contending the Court’s grounding of a right’s 
importance in explicit constitutional or statutory rights, “undermines the rationale of some of the 
Court’s past decisions”). 
 93. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990), available at http://www 
.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc.pdf. 
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suggested a variety of alterations to the federal court system, including a 
particularly relevant recommendation that the Supreme Court be delegated 
rulemaking authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to define what constitutes a 
final decision for appeal as of right, and to define circumstances in which 
non-final orders may be immediately appealed.
94
  
Quite clearly, this recommendation would add another wrinkle to the 
Court’s already murky collateral order jurisprudence by adding a new 
source of authority. A brief look into the legislative history of the Report 
and Congress’s subsequent legislation will lead us to the Court’s eventual 
confrontation of their newfound rulemaking authority. This confrontation 
took nearly two decades and, interestingly, occurred when Justice 
Sotomayor—the only member of the Supreme Court to serve as a district 
court judge who confronted issues of immediate appeals—penned her first 
opinion as a Supreme Court Justice in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. 
Carpenter.
95
 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTIONS 1292(E) AND 2072(C) 
A. The History 
In 1988, Congress authorized, and Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed, a 
fifteen-member Federal Courts Study Committee as a response to 
“mounting public and professional concern with the federal courts’ 
congestion, delay, expense, and expansion . . . .”96 The final Report of the 
Committee consists of 220 pages of various recommendations for a 
Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990. It spans 
from the revolutionary suggestion to “abolis[h] federal diversity 
jurisdiction”97 to the less monumental, but equally important suggestion 
that “Congress should amend 28 U.S.C. § 331 to recognize the [Judicial] 
Conference’s authority to issue administrative rules”98—two paragraphs 
had the power to fundamentally alter the collateral order doctrine. In a 
section aimed at “Reducing Litigation’s Complexity and Expediting Its 
Flow”99 the Committee recommended that Congress delegate rulemaking 
 
 
 94. Id. at 95. 
 95. 558 U.S. 100 (2009). 
 96. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 93, at 3. 
 97. Id. at 14. Although, the Report does include certain exceptions where federal courts would 
still retain diversity jurisdiction in the most important of instances. See id. at 38–42. 
 98. Id. at 148. 
 99.  See id. at 89. 
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authority to the Supreme Court to define what constitutes a final decision 
and declare when non-final orders may be immediately appealed.
100
  
In the text explaining the recommendation, the Committee pointed to 
the “difficulties arising from definitions of an appealable order”101 
suggesting the Court’s continued deliberations and lack of precision 
concerning the collateral order doctrine may have been a primary driving 
force behind their decision. Even more direct, the Committee declared that 
“[t]he state of the law . . . strikes many observers as unsatisfactory in 
several respects.”102 And then, no doubt reflecting on the Court’s recent 
docket, the Committee noted that this area of the law has “produced much 
purely procedural litigation.”103 In turn, this recognition spurred the 
Committee to report that the Court’s repeated attention has “blur[ed] the 
edges of the finality principle” and “may in some circumstances restrict 
too sharply the opportunity for interlocutory review.”104 These specific 
factors seem to have motivated the Committee to propose its 
recommendation, but not without further guidance on what was to be 
expected. 
The Committee, for example, made two specific proposals in the text 
accompanying its recommendation. First, they suggested the rulemaking 
authority should include the ability to broaden, narrow, or systematize the 
law created by the Court’s previous decisions concerning finality.105 And 
second, the Committee suggested that the rulemaking authority leave room 
to “add to—but not subtract from—the list of categories of interlocutory 
appeal permitted by Congress” in Section 1292.106 
Only five months after the Report of the Federal Courts Study 
Committee was published, Congress passed the Judicial Improvements 
Act of 1990.
107
 Unsurprisingly, the stated purpose of the legislation in the 
House was to “implement several of the more noncontroversial 
 
 
 100. The Committee summarized its recommendation as follows: 
To deal with difficulties arising from definitions of an appealable order, Congress should 
consider delegating to the Supreme Court the authority under the Rules Enabling Act to 
define what constitutes a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and to define 
circumstances in which orders and actions of district courts not otherwise subject to appeal 
under acts of Congress may be appealed to the courts of appeals.  
Id. at 95. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 96. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
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recommendations” of the Committee’s Report.108 Congress, however, only 
implemented the first recommendation from the Committee. In Section 
104, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 2072 to include a new subsection (c), 
granting the Supreme Court rulemaking authority for “[s]uch rules [that] 
shall define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of 
appeal under section 1291 of this title.”109 Congress pointed to the 
“continuing spate of procedural litigation” as a driving force behind this 
amendment, including their hope that such litigation could be “reduced, if 
not eliminated” by the Court promulgating a rule that clarifies the scope of 
a final decision.
110
  
While Congress provided a new rulemaking authority for the Supreme 
Court to define finality per the first recommendation from the Committee, 
it took Congress another two years to pass legislation amending the scope 
of interlocutory appeals in Section 1292 in accordance with the 
Committee’s second recommendation.111 In the first section of the 
legislation, Congress amended Section 1292 to include a new 
subsection (e), granting the Supreme Court further rulemaking authority to 
“provide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals 
that is not otherwise provided” in Section 1292.112 Now, the Court has the 
additional power of defining, by rule, the scope of finality in determining 
what non-final orders may be immediately appealable. The stated purpose 
from the House Report was to “permit the Supreme Court, pursuant to its 
rulemaking authority . . . to expand the appealability of interlocutory 
determinations by the courts of appeals.”113  
 
 
 108. H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6861. 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006). Recall, § 1291 is the basic 
statute outlining the scope of appellate jurisdiction, permitting the appeal of a “final” decision from a 
district court to an appellate court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 110. The entirety of the Section 104 “Analysis” provided by the House of Representatives is as 
follows: 
 This section implements a recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee 
found on page 95 of its Report, that authorizes the promulgation of rules which define when a 
decision by the district court is final for purposes of appeals. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291, 
appeals may be had from final decisions. Considerable uncertainty exists, however, as to the 
scope of a final decision. The result is a continuing spate of procedural litigation that could be 
reduced, if not eliminated, by the promulgation of clarifying rules. This section gives the 
Supreme Court the authority to promulgate such rules. As with the Court's rulemaking power 
generally, the Supreme Court's power to clarify the scope of a final decision is circumscribed 
by the requirement that its rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 18. 
 111. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 112. Id.; See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006). 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 102-1006, pt. 1, at 18 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3921, 3927. 
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While the legislative history is limited, the purpose behind the Supreme 
Court’s newly created rulemaking authority can be gleaned by piecing 
together the House Reports and the Report from the Federal Courts Study 
Committee. First, Congress was clear in its dissatisfaction with the current 
flux in the Court’s finality jurisprudence—chiefly, the collateral order 
doctrine.
114
 Congress intended for the Court to take responsibility and put 
its house in order by making use of the power, granted by Congress, to 
define the scope of finality and promulgate a rule to outline what non-final 
orders could be immediately appealed. 
Second, Congress intended—as evidenced by the amendment to 
Section 1292—for the Court to expand the list of immediately appealable 
non-final orders. Section 1292 itself contains the statutory list of 
immediately appealable non-final orders—it is a small one.115 Congress 
explicitly granted the Court, through the text of subsection (e), the power 
to enlarge the list of appealable non-final orders, while prohibiting the 
Court from subtracting from the list. The House Report reaffirmed this 
textual interpretation, specifically declaring its desire for the amendment 
to “expand the appealability of interlocutory determinations by the courts 
of appeals.”116  
On the whole, the history suggests that Congress intended this new 
rulemaking authority to be an alternative mechanism for the Court to 
expand the collateral order doctrine to new situations.
117
 The Supreme 
Court, however, would think differently. 
 
 
 114. See Joan Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction 
Before and After Swint, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1362–63 (1998) (“The Committee's primary concern 
appears to have been the problems created for litigants and for the courts by the uncertainty 
surrounding ‘finality.’”). 
 115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006). Generally, Congress determined only a few non-final orders 
could be appealed as of right—for example, injunctions § 1292(a)(1)—or, by permission—via the 
certification process, § 1292(b). For a more thorough treatment of these sections, see Martineau, supra 
note 44, at 729–35. 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 102-1006, pt. 1, at 18. 
 117. See generally Steinman, supra note 114, at 1363 (describing Congress’s and the Federal 
Court Study Committee’s intent to expand, not contract, the scope of interlocutory appeals, and 
finding, for a variety of reasons, that Congress did not intend to undermine the Court’s previous 
authority to do so). See also, Martineau, supra note 44, at 772 (explaining how the amendments will 
expand the list of which non-final orders may be immediately appealable). But Martineau also strongly 
opposes the amendments because he contends they will defeat the Committee’s stated goals  
   to reduce litigation on issues of finality and appealability, to avoid dismissal of appeals as 
premature, and in particular, to avoid instances in which an appeal of an order not truly final 
but immediately appealable is held to be untimely because the appeal was not taken until after 
the final judgment was entered. 
 Id.  
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B. The Supreme Court’s Mistaken Interpretation  
The Supreme Court first confronted its newfound rulemaking authority 
in Swint v. Chambers County Commission,
118
 three years after Congress 
amended the statutes governing finality and appeals of non-final orders. 
Here the Court was asked to expand the collateral order doctrine to include 
a district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment.119 The Court 
issued a “firm No.”120  
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg recognized the new authority 
granted by Congress, and interpreted the statute as a prohibition of 
“expansion by court decision” of the collateral order doctrine.121 Instead of 
extrapolating a sweeping authority for Court action from the legislative 
history,
122
 Justice Ginsburg read Congress’s amendments as a requirement 
that any subsequent clarification by the Court as to when a decision 
qualifies as “final,” or any expansion of which non-final orders may be 
immediately appealable, must only be accomplished through the 
rulemaking process.
123
 In essence, it would seem that the Court, possibly 
recognizing the futility of its previous attempts at defining the scope of the 
collateral order doctrine, suggested that Congress or the formal 
rulemaking process should have exclusive control over the future of the 
collateral order doctrine and the Court’s finality jurisprudence.124 
Unfortunately, rather than address the legislative history of the 
amendments—as fully addressed above125—Justice Ginsburg chose to 
suggest a flat prohibition against the Court’s future role in expanding the 
collateral order doctrine. Such historical evidence, however, would have 
suggested that this was not Congress’s intention.126 Joan Steinman, a 
leading academic in the field of appellate courts and jurisdiction, has 
explained that the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee “make[s] 
 
 
 118. 514 U.S. 35 (1995). 
 119. Id. at 41. 
 120. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Interestingly, although Swint was decided barely a year after 
Digital, where the Court embraced the significance of the “importance” of the right at issue, the Court 
in Swint conducted a Cohen analysis, yet the Court made no mention of the “importance” of the right. 
See Anderson, supra note 31, at 595. 
 121. Swint, 541 U.S. at 48 (“The procedure Congress ordered for such changes, however, is not 
expansion by court decision, but by rulemaking under § 2072.”). 
   122. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 123. Swint, 541 U.S. at 48 (“Congress’ designation of the rulemaking process as the way to define 
or refine when a district court ruling is ‘final’ and when an interlocutory order is appealable warrants 
the Judiciary’s full respect.”). 
 124. See Steinman, supra note 114, at 1360–61. 
 125. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 126. Steinman, supra note 114 at 1363. See also discussion supra Part II.A. 
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clear that the Committee was focusing on a shift of responsibility from 
Congress to rule makers,” but that Congress “certainly did not view the 
regime it proposed as one that would preempt the field and prevent other 
players . . . from having a continuing role in working out the law of 
appealability.”127 
Although Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Swint suggests that the Court is 
prohibited from expanding the collateral order doctrine through judicial 
decision-making, the legislative history suggests the opposite: that 
expansion through both judicial decision-making and rulemaking is the 
goal. While the Court’s interpretation in Swint appears mistaken, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed its interpretation in Justice Sotomayor’s first 
opinion for the Court. 
In Mohawk Industries, the Court was asked whether a lower court’s 
disclosure order for sensitive information adverse to the attorney-client 
privilege qualified as an immediately appealable non-final order under the 
collateral order doctrine.
128
 The Court
129
 refused, reasoning that 
“[p]ostjudgment appeals, together with other review mechanisms, suffice 
to protect the rights of litigants and preserve the vitality of the 
attorney-client privilege.”130 In effect, Justice Sotomayor seemingly 
introduced a new factor in the Cohen analysis: the availability of 
conceivable alternatives to a collateral order appeal.
131
 At the same time, 
however, the Court reaffirmed its strict confinement of the collateral order 
doctrine, noting, “it must ‘never be allowed to swallow the general rule 
that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final 
judgment has been entered.’”132 The Court buttressed its position by 
stating, “[o]ur admonition reflects a healthy respect for the virtues of the 
final-judgment rule.”133 Justice Sotomayor made the Court’s position very 
 
 
 127. Id. Of practical note, the Court would necessarily be involved in any rulemaking process 
because the Rules Enabling Act grants the judicial branch primary responsibility for any rules 
promulgated pursuant to Congress’s scheme. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). See also Steinman, supra note 
114, at 1360, n.84. As a result, the Supreme Court is the body with the rulemaking power.  
 128. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 103 (2009). 
 129. Of note, Justice Sotomayor issued her first opinion as a Supreme Court Justice in Mohawk 
Industries. Adhering to the custom of first opinions, the decision was unanimous—although, Justice 
Thomas issued a separate concurrence. See Tony Mauro, Sotomayor Announces Her First Opinion on 
Busy Day at Supreme Court, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Dec. 8, 2009, 1:22 PM), http://legaltimes 
.typepad.com/blt/2009/12/sotomayor-announces-her-first-opinion-on-busy-day-at-supreme-court.html. 
 130. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 103. 
 131. Id. at 110 (“[W]ere attorneys and clients to reflect upon their appellate options, they would 
find that litigants confronted with a particularly injurious or novel privilege ruling have several 
potential avenues of review apart from collateral order appeal.”). 
 132. Id. at 106 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994)). 
 133. Id. 
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clear: the Cohen factors will be narrowly interpreted to strictly confine the 
collateral order doctrine by both adding new limitations and liberally 
invoking policy justifications to support these limitations of the scope of 
the collateral order doctrine.
134
  
The Court not only relied on perceived policy justifications
135
 for its 
refusal to expand the doctrine, but also invoked its rulemaking authority 
under Sections 1292(e) and 2072(c) as a shield in declining to apply the 
collateral order doctrine to new situations.
136
 Justice Sotomayor devoted a 
separate portion of the opinion to confront Congress’s grant of rulemaking 
authority “in recent years,”137 and she made clear that the Court would be 
out of the business of creating judge-made exceptions to the collateral 
order doctrine.
138
 
This position against any further judicial-carving-out of Cohen 
exceptions was bolstered by Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which 
actually derided the Court for conducting a Cohen analysis at all.
139
 
Rather, Justice Thomas suggested, since the disclosure order at issue did 
not fall into any category of previously-recognized Cohen exceptions, the 
rulemaking authority granted by Congress prohibited the Court from even 
considering including such a non-final order within the collateral order 
doctrine.
140
  
Commentators have modestly interpreted the two opinions, read 
together, to “suggest the emergence of a fairly strong preference for the 
development of rules through the rulemaking process.”141 Justice 
Sotomayor’s opinion read with Justice Thomas’s concurrence actually 
 
 
 134. While the Court effectively set the odds against expanding the collateral order doctrine, 
Justice Sotomayor, in her application of the Cohen analysis, actually invoked a balancing approach. Id. 
at 112 (“[T]he limited benefits of applying ‘the blunt, categorical instrument of § 1291 collateral order 
appeal’ to privilege-related disclosure orders simply cannot justify the likely institutional costs . . . .”) 
(quoting Digital, 511 U.S. at 883). 
 135. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 106 (“Permitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals, we have 
recognized, undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’ and encroaches upon the prerogatives of 
district court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation”) (quoting Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)). 
 136. Id. at 113–14. 
 137. Id. at 113. 
 138. Id. at 114 (“Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if 
at all, through rulemaking . . . .”).  
 139. Id. at 115 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“We need not, and in my view should not, further justify 
our holding by applying the Cohen doctrine, which prompted the rulemaking amendments in the first 
place. In taking this path, the Court needlessly perpetuates a judicial policy that we for many years 
have criticized and struggled to limit.”). 
 140. Id.  
 141. James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by Agreement of the 
Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043, 1053 (2011). 
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appears to sound a death-knell on further expansion of the collateral order 
doctrine through either judicial decision-making or rulemaking.
142
 From 
Justice Sotomayor’s single statement that, “[a]ny further avenue for 
immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if at all, through 
rulemaking,”143 the Court has entrenched itself in two separate and 
mistaken interpretations of Congress’s intentions behind the finality 
amendments. 
First, Justice Sotomayor reaffirmed the Court’s mistaken interpretation 
from Swint that Congress intended the rulemaking process to be the sole 
mechanism for introducing changes to either the definition of “finality” or 
the scope of non-final, immediately appealable orders under the collateral 
order doctrine.
144
 As shown by the legislative history, taken from both 
Congress and the Committee’s Report,145 a more accurate interpretation of 
Congress’s intent behind the amendments was to provide an alternative 
mechanism for the Court to clear the confusion surrounding its murky 
finality jurisprudence. Even worse, Justice Sotomayor commingled the 
Court’s interpretation of the legislative history in Swint with the text of the 
legislation itself. Rather than citing to the text of the legislation or its 
history as support for the contention that Congress’s amendments 
constituted “legislation designating rulemaking, ‘not expansion by court 
decision,’ as the preferred means for determining whether and when 
prejudgment orders should be immediately appealable,” Justice Sotomayor 
cited solely to Swint.
146
 Neither the text of the legislation nor its legislative 
history supported such a contention, yet the Court, by singularly relying on 
Swint, entrenched itself in its mistaken interpretation.
147
 
 
 
 142. See James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory 
Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493, 498–99 (2011) (suggesting “Justice Thomas 
would eschew all future judge-made expansions in the collateral order doctrine” from his position in 
Mohawk Industries). 
 143. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 114. 
 144. See supra discussion accompanying notes 118–30.  
 145. See discussion supra Part II.A.  
 146. Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 113 (citing Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 
(1995)). 
 147. Justice Thomas went even further in his interpretation of Congress’s intention behind 
granting the Court rulemaking authority, finding that Congress acted upon its recognition that “such 
value judgments are better left to the ‘collective experience of bench and bar’ and the ‘opportunity for 
full airing’ that rulemaking provides.” Id. at 118–19 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Sotomayor’s 
majority opinion at 114). The “value judgments” meaning the decision as to what non-final orders 
should be immediately appealable.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
742 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:721 
 
 
 
 
Second, Justice Sotomayor refused to correct the Court’s mistaken 
position that the collateral order doctrine is not to be expanded,
148
 even 
though Congress specifically intended such expansion to occur.
149
 
Although Justice Sotomayor conducted a full Cohen analysis, such an 
analysis would be irrelevant if we take the Court at its word that its 
rulemaking authority prevents it from expanding the collateral order 
doctrine even if it wanted to. Justice Thomas properly stretched the 
Court’s position in Swint—as adopted by Justice Sotomayor—to its logical 
conclusion by invoking the rulemaking authority as a complete shield to 
any appellate litigator’s attempt to persuade the Court to expand the 
collateral order doctrine, when he refused to even conduct the Cohen 
analysis. Quite correctly, however, if the Court is without power to 
judicially expand the Cohen exceptions due to its rulemaking authority, it 
is rather unnecessary to apply the Cohen analysis at all.  
Of more concern, however, if the Court continues to invoke its 
rulemaking authority as a complete shield to expansion of the collateral 
order doctrine, the only mechanism to effectuate Congress’s stated 
intent—to clarify the finality jurisprudence while expanding the number of 
immediately appealable non-final orders—is the rulemaking process. This 
process, however, has been largely dormant since Congress empowered 
the Court in 1990—barring the sole exception of Rule 23(f).150 Indeed, the 
Court has referenced its power to define the scope of immediately 
appealable non-final orders granted by Section 1292(e) in only five 
cases.
151
 Although a complete contravention of Congress’s stated intent for 
 
 
 148. Id. at 114 (“Any further avenue for immediate appeal of such rulings should be furnished, if 
at all, through rulemaking . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 149. The House Report reaffirms this textual interpretation, specifically declaring its desire for the 
amendment to “expand the appealability of interlocutory determinations by the courts of appeals.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-1006, pt. 1, at 18 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3921, 3927. See also 
supra text accompanying note 113.  
 150. The Supreme Court has not promulgated a rule to define what constitutes a final decision  
 under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the Judicial Conference of the United States has not 
recommended a rule, the Committee on Practice and Procedure has not transmitted a 
proposed rule to the conference, and the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure has not proposed a rule, nor has it even undertaken to consider such a 
rule.  
See Anderson, supra note 31, at 587. Although Anderson published this quote in 1998, it still is 
factually correct. See infra note 154 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court and the rulemaking 
bodies have, however, invoked the authority granted under § 1292(e) to promulgate Rule 23(f), which 
grants the courts of appeals the discretion to allow an immediate appeal of an order granting or 
denying a class-action certification. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  
 151. See Alexandra B. Hess et al., Permissive Interlocutory Appeals at the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995–2010), 60 AM. U. L. REV. 757, 764 n.37 (2011) 
(noting that by 2011 the Court had only referenced its power under § 1292(e) in only five cases and 
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the Court to expand the scope of immediately appealable non-final orders, 
it is quite clear that the suggestion in Mohawk Industries that the Court 
was going out of the business of judicially expanding the collateral order 
doctrine has become the definitive law. 
At this point, the state of the Court’s finality jurisprudence regarding 
the collateral order doctrine is at an impasse. The Court refuses to 
judicially expand the collateral order doctrine, while simultaneously 
invoking its rulemaking authority as a non-penetrable shield against any 
expansion attempt.
152
 Congress intended the Court to revise its finality 
jurisprudence.
153
 The Court, however, has not only limited itself to the 
rulemaking authority as the only mechanism to effectuate revision, but 
also has only once since 1990 invoked its rulemaking authority to 
promulgate such a rule.
154
 Because the collateral order doctrine is unsuited 
for codification as a federal rule, the collateral order doctrine and the 
Court’s finality jurisprudence are in a precarious position.155 That is why 
the Court should reverse course and rectify the situation by reading 
Congress’s intent into the interpretation of the statutory amendments 
governing finality and the scope of interlocutory appeals. In doing so, the 
Court should simultaneously release the collateral order doctrine from its 
currently strict confinement by providing the lower courts with a 
workable, flexible standard for determining the scope of immediately 
appealable non-final orders. 
III. THE UNSUITABILITY OF THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE AS A 
FEDERAL RULE 
After Mohawk Industries, the path to expanding the collateral order 
doctrine must either navigate the rulemaking process or be specifically 
addressed by Congress through legislation. Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure
156
 provides the lone example of how expansion can be 
 
 
citing to Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 691 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting); Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 114; Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio., 527 U.S. 198, 
210 (1999); Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995); and Swint, 514 U.S. at 48). 
 152. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011) (declining to allow an appeal from a denial of 
summary judgment after a full trial on the merits).  
 153. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 154. See Carey M. Erhard, Note, A Discussion of the Interlocutory Review of Class Certification 
Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 151, 157 (2002) (“Rule 23(f) 
is the only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure created under § 1292(e)”). 
 155. See discussion infra Part III. 
 156.  “A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action 
certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 
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accomplished through the rulemaking process.
157
 While the structure and 
subsequent application of Rule 23(f) in the appellate courts may serve as a 
model for future codification of immediately appealable non-final orders, 
the rule also exemplifies the inadequacy of solely relying on the 
rulemaking process to effectuate Congress’s purpose of clarifying the 
Court’s finality jurisprudence while expanding the scope of the collateral 
order doctrine.
158
 Rather than designate rulemaking as the exclusive 
avenue for expansion, the Court should break from their self-imposed 
handcuffs and embrace the alternative route for expansion through judicial 
decision-making.
159
 
A. The Codification Story of Rule 23(f) 
While Rule 23(f) is a prime example of how the rulemaking authority 
granted by Section 1292(e) can be used to expand the contours of the 
collateral order doctrine, it also illustrates the inadequacies of sole reliance 
on the rulemaking authority to determine the scope of the doctrine. 
Certainly, the promulgation of Rule 23(f) is a positive development for 
those parties seeking to immediately appeal a court order granting or 
denying class-action certification. But Rule 23(f) also illustrates the 
inadequacies of such an approach for two reasons. First, the circuit courts 
have adopted a variety of standards to determine what orders qualify, 
confusing both courts and litigants.
160
 Second, it proves that such an 
approach is only workable if the rulemakers are prepared to address and 
apply the same process for every other prejudgment order. As a result, 
while Rule 23(f) has expanded the scope of the collateral order doctrine, it 
has, at the same time, sounded the death-knell for future use of the 
approach due to its unintended consequences. 
A full description of the formal rule-making process is beyond the 
scope of this Note,
161
 but as a previous Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory 
 
 
days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the 
district judge or the court of appeals so orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). 
 157. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 158. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 159. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 160. See Christopher A. Kitchen, Note, Interlocutory Appeal of Class Action Certification 
Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): A Proposal for A New Guideline, 2004 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 231, 244–52 (detailing the variety of standards the circuit courts have adopted 
and applied in determining appealability under Rule 23(f)).  
 161. For a full description of the rulemaking process and its contextual background, see generally 
Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 
N.M. L. REV. 261 (2009). 
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Committee summarized: “Suffice it to say that it is slow, deliberate and 
utterly transparent—and purposely so.”162 Generally, the advisory 
committees that work under the direction of the Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure receive suggestions from both the bench 
and the bar—among other interested groups—regarding potential rule 
changes.
163
 Then, proposed changes are recommended and sent from the 
standing committees, to the Judicial Conference, and then to the Supreme 
Court and to Congress.
164
 As Judge Kravitz noted, it is a time-consuming 
process with most rules navigating the process for at least three years, but 
in many cases “for quite a bit longer.”165  
At the same time Congress was implementing the recommendations of 
the Federal Courts Study Committee in the early 1990s,
166
 the Advisory 
Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took under 
consideration a variety of proposals that suggested amendments to Rule 
23,
167
 with a final draft of the proposed amendments published in 1996.
168
 
The comments to the proposed amendment shed light on both the 
motivations behind proposing Rule 23(f) and a broader debate concerning 
the merits of allowing immediate appeals of non-final orders.
169
 The 
supporters of Rule 23(f) advanced similar arguments to those put forward 
for expanding the collateral order doctrine generally. For example, a 
 
 
 162. Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise: That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 213, 
216 (2010). Judge Kravitz served as Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee from June 2007 
until his death in September 2012. He also served as a member of the Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure from 2001–2007, and was a United States District Judge for the District of 
Connecticut. 
 163. Id. (describing the general rulemaking structure, including the relationship between 
Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Supreme Court, the Standing Committee, 
and the advisory committees).  
 164. Id. at 215–17. 
 165. Id. at 216 (“Most rules that make it through this process have been considered for at least 
three years; many rules are considered for quite a bit longer.”).  
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 107–16. 
 167. The history of the draft proposals, including internal comments from advisory committee 
members and external comments from interested members of the bench and bar, are reprinted in 
RULES COMM. SUPPORT OFFICE, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1–4 WORKING PAPERS OF THE 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23 (1997) 
[hereinafter WORKING PAPERS], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
archives/fjc-studies-and-related-publications.aspx. 
 168. For the text of the proposed amendments, see Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559, 559–60 (1996). See id. at 560–66 for the advisory committee note 
corresponding to the proposed amendments to Rule 23 [hereinafter Committee Note].  
 169. See WORKING PAPERS, supra note 167 (providing comments reprinted in full). For a useful 
summary of the arguments advanced by both supporters and opponents, see Michael E. Solimine & 
Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by 
the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1565–66 
(2000); see also Erhard, supra note 154, at 156 (providing a similar overview). 
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prominent argument put forth was that “class certification is ‘the whole 
ballgame’ and is an important issue that deserves an immediate appeal.”170 
Other supporters pointed to the inadequacy of the certification procedures 
and mandamus as provided in Section 1292(b) as alternatives, and 
contended that the immediate appeal provided by the proposal would be a 
“useful safety valve.”171 On the other hand, opponents of the proposal 
asserted that the inevitable result of Rule 23(f) would be “an increase in 
litigation expenses and further delays in resolving class actions”—the 
same argument generally made in opposition to expanding the collateral 
order doctrine.
172
 
Six years after the first draft was proposed in November 1992, Rule 
23(f) went into effect on December 1, 1998.
173
 The text of Rule 23(f) is as 
follows: 
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition for 
permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 14 days 
after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the 
district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so 
orders.
174
 
The committee note accompanying Rule 23(f) outlines the principal 
concerns that motivated the committee’s decision to expand the collateral 
order doctrine. The committee relied on a simple cost-benefit analysis 
showing that the identified concerns can be “met at low cost” if appellate 
courts have discretionary power to allow immediate appeals “in cases that 
show appeal-worthy certification issues.”175 The committee note also 
acknowledged that Rule 23(f) was modeled on the certification procedure 
under Section 1292(b), but deliberately distinguished the two by 
 
 
 170. Solimine & Hines, supra note 169, at 1565 n.181 (citing 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 
167, at 409 (summary of comments by William T. Coleman, Jr.)). 
 171. Id. at 1565 n.183 (citing 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 167, at 409 (summary of comments 
by Bartlett H. McGuire)). 
 172. Solimine & Hines, supra note 169, at 1566 (citing 1 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 167, at 
408 (summary of comments by Richard A. Lockridge and Michael D. Donovan); see also 1 WORKING 
PAPERS, supra note 167, at 409, 413 (summary of comments by Stanley M. Chesley and Joseph 
Goldberg). 
 173. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Evidence and 
Appellate Procedure, 177 F.R.D. 530 (1998) (authorizing the Chief Justice to transmit Rule 23(f) to 
Congress in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act, and establishing the effective date of December 
1, 1998). See Solimine & Hines, supra note 169, at 1564–65 n.180, for an explanation behind the 
withdrawal of the other proposed amendments to Rule 23. 
 174. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). 
 175. Committee Note, supra note 168, at 565. 
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specifying that Rule 23(f) would operate more liberally by not requiring 
certification and by not being subject to the “potentially limiting 
requirements of Section 1292(b).”176 And finally, the committee note 
instructed that, “[p]ermission to appeal may be granted or denied on the 
basis of any consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive.”177 
On the whole, the committee note suggests that broadening the contours of 
the collateral order doctrine is a low-cost method of addressing trial court 
errors, and also that the courts of appeal should have broad discretion in 
determining immediate appealability on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Rule 23(f) As Both A Model for Future Codification and Evidence 
Against Sole Reliance on the Rulemaking Process to Expand the 
Collateral Order Doctrine 
The Seventh Circuit was the first court in which an application for 
appeal was filed under Rule 23(f),
178
 and Judge Easterbrook’s opinion 
provides further evidence of both the purpose and application of the rule. 
The court first embraced the discretionary nature of its review, noting that 
“[n]either a bright-line approach nor a catalog of factors would serve well” 
in the court’s determination of whether the appeal should be granted.179 
Instead, the court suggested a case-by-case approach focusing on whether 
the “denial of class status seems likely to be fatal” and, if so, whether the 
“plaintiff has a solid argument in opposition to the district court’s 
decision.”180  
Notably, Judge Easterbrook dismissed the argument that the approach 
outlined above would result in greater litigation delays by drawing an 
analogy to the preliminary injunction analysis.
181
 Structurally, Rule 23(f) 
prevents delay because an application requesting an appeal does not stop 
the litigation at the trial level.
182
 Either the district court or the court of 
appeals can issue a stay, which would inevitably delay the litigation, but 
 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 566. 
 178. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 833 (7th Cir. 1999) (“This rule became 
effective on December 1, 1998, and we have for consideration the first application filed in this circuit 
(and, so far as we can tell, the nation) under the new rule.”). 
 179. Id. at 834. 
 180. Id. Judge Easterbrook also instructed that “if the ruling is impervious to revision there’s no 
point to an interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 835. The court also acknowledged that an application for 
immediate appeal would be more likely to succeed if the appeal “may facilitate the development of the 
law.” Id. 
 181. Id.  
 182. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“An appeal does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the 
district judge or the court of appeals so orders.”). 
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that determination is made on a similar basis as the approach outlined 
above, and similar to the analysis conducted in determining whether to 
issue a preliminary injunction.
183
  
In essence, Judge Easterbrook suggested taking a two-fold approach—
considering both the irreparable harm to the parties and the likelihood of 
the appeal’s success. As will be more fully developed below, not only 
does such an approach properly recognize that a discretionary review is 
the best method for determining whether to grant or deny an immediate 
appeal, but it also capitalizes on the pragmatism of the elements of a 
preliminary injunction analysis in looking to evidence of both irreparable 
harm and the likelihood of success.
184
 
Although the standard developed by the Seventh Circuit to determine 
whether an immediate appeal should be granted under Rule 23(f) makes 
considerable sense, significant flaws still exist that suggest rulemaking is 
not the most satisfactory method for achieving Congress’s two-pronged 
goal of clarifying finality jurisprudence and increasing the number of 
immediately appealable non-final orders. For example, the path from 
proposal to adoption for Rule 23(f) provides new meaning to Judge 
Kravitz’s description of the rulemaking process as “slow, deliberate, and 
utterly transparent.”185 Indeed, rather than the three years Judge Kravitz 
suggested was the minimum amount of time necessary, the process took at 
least six years before Rule 23(f) took effect.
186
 Surely the rulemaking 
bodies could promulgate similar rules setting forth new classes of 
immediately appealable non-final orders, but the impracticality of such a 
proposal is evidenced by the fact that Rule 23(f) is the lone example of a 
rule promulgated under Section 1292(e) and through the formal 
rulemaking process.
187
 By contrast, before the Supreme Court retired from 
the business of judicially expanding the collateral order doctrine, it 
decided the appealability of certain non-final orders on average once per 
year.
188
 While an argument can be made that such an approach is simply 
passing the responsibility from rulemaking bodies to the Court, this 
 
 
 183. See Blair, 181 F.3d at 835 (noting that “a stay would depend on a demonstration that the 
probability of error in the class certification decision is high enough that the costs of pressing ahead in 
the district court exceed the costs of waiting,” and acknowledging that “[t]his is the same kind of 
question that a court asks when deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction”).  
 184. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 185. Kravitz, supra note 162, at 216. 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 166–75. 
 187. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 188. Anderson, supra note 31, at 581 (“[D]uring the era of expansion from 1974 to 1988, the issue 
commanded the Court's attention fourteen times, or once a year.”). 
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argument falls short in light of the Court’s more efficient capabilities in 
addressing appellate litigators’ novel attempts to expand the collateral 
order doctrine.
189
  
On the whole, while Rule 23(f) is limited to the appealability of 
class-action certification orders, it can provide a model for codifying a 
broad standard encompassing a flexible and largely discretionary approach 
to analyzing applications for appeal under the collateral order doctrine. At 
the very least, it is clear that the rigid judicial approach the Court applied 
to determine whether broad classes of non-final orders could be 
immediately appealed was both over and under inclusive. Subsequent 
opinions establishing standards for analyzing Rule 23(f) applications 
embrace the broad discretion granted to courts of appeal, while deriding 
any potential “rule that would clearly delineate every instance in which 
our interlocutory review . . . is appropriate.”190 Although Rule 23(f) 
illustrates the flaws in rulemaking, it also presents a method for expanding 
the collateral order doctrine that is better suited to the task than the 
Supreme Court’s previous attempts at clarification, or any future attempt 
to codify a broad standard attempting to delineate every instance in which 
an immediate appeal is available. 
While useful, Rule 23(f) also illustrates the limitations of codification 
as evidenced not only by its lengthy codification story
191
 but also by the 
fact that it is the only federal rule that has been codified under the 
authority of Section 1292(e).
192
 That is why the Court should revisit its 
reliance on a mistaken interpretation of Sections 2072(c) and 1292(e), and 
acknowledge the appropriateness of judicial expansion of the collateral 
order doctrine as a viable supplement to the rulemaking process. In doing 
 
 
 189. I assert that the frequency of issues regarding the scope of the collateral order doctrine 
reaching the Court’s docket during the expansion era is evidence that the Court has “more efficient 
capabilities” than the rulemaking bodies, such as those involved in the promulgation of Rule 23(f) of 
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, given the time taken to dispose of issues regarding the scope of 
the collateral order doctrine. 
 190. Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009) (also noting that, “we emphasize 
that our discretion in granting or denying a petition for interlocutory review is broad, and necessarily 
so”); see also Prado–Steiman v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that its 
“authority to accept Rule 23(f) petitions is highly discretionary, and the . . . list of factors is not 
intended to be exhaustive; there may well be special circumstances that lead us to grant or deny a Rule 
23(f) petition even where some or all of the relevant factors point to a different result”); Blair v. 
Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that its discretionary review 
suggests that “[n]either a bright-line approach nor a catalog of factors would serve well . . . when 
courts necessarily must experiment with the new class of appeals”). 
 191. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
 192. See Erhard, supra note 154, at 157 (“Rule 23(f) is the only Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
created under § 1292(e).”). 
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so, the Court should embrace Rule 23(f) as a model for future federal rules 
regarding the immediate appealability of non-final orders. But recognizing 
the flaws of the rulemaking process, the Court should also adopt a broad 
standard—one similar to Judge Easterbrook’s proposed approach to 
analyzing applications for appeal under Rule 23(f)—for courts to apply to 
all applications for appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 
IV. THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE AS A FLEXIBLE STANDARD 
In 1949 the Supreme Court invented the collateral order doctrine.
193
 In 
1992, Congress provided the Court with another tool to expand the list of 
immediately appealable non-final orders by granting the Court rulemaking 
authority.
194
 Culminating in Mohawk Industries in 2009, the Court strictly 
confined the collateral order doctrine to its current state by refusing to 
expand the doctrine through judicial decision-making.
195
 It is time for the 
Court to break the current impasse and reinvent the collateral order 
doctrine.
196
 The Court should reverse course by finally effectuating 
Congress’s stated intent in enacting Sections 1292(e) and 2072(c) to 
expand the list of immediately appealable non-final orders through both 
judicial decision-making and the rulemaking authority.  
Professor Steinman, urging a similar reconsideration of the collateral 
order doctrine and appellate mandamus, identified a “new model of 
adjudication”197 that necessitates caution from the Court’s “return to strict 
adherence to the final judgment rule.”198 This “new model of adjudication” 
is a simple reflection of modern pretrial litigation, in which there has been 
a significant decrease in the number of claims resulting in a true final 
judgment.
199
 Rather, the non-final decisions, such as “interlocutory 
decisions relating to jurisdiction, alternative dispute resolution, pleadings, 
class actions, discovery, and summary judgment” are serving as the 
dispositive ruling in much litigation.
200
 As a result, many non-final orders 
are having the effect of finality without qualifying as a true final 
 
 
 193. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 195. Mohawk Indus., Inc., v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113–14 (2009). 
 196. As one commentator has noted, this is not as revolutionary as it may seem. Steinman, supra 
note 14, at 1240 (recognizing that the collateral order doctrine is a creature of the Court’s own making, 
and, as a result, if the Court can invent the doctrine, the Court certainly can reinvent it).  
 197. Id. at 1241. 
 198. Id. 1240–41. 
 199. Id. at 1240. 
 200. Id. at 1241. 
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judgment.
201
 In these situations, although the parties may have reached a 
final decision, neither party has an appealable final decision because there 
is no final judgment.
202
 When considered in light of the broad purposes 
immediate appeals of non-final orders serve in the appellate court system, 
the problems created by this new model of adjudication warrant the 
Court’s attention in revisiting the collateral order doctrine and adopting a 
more flexible approach to confronting these new issues. 
In a broad sense, the immediate appealability of non-final orders serves 
three goals that coincide with the general purpose of the appellate court 
system. First, immediate appealability serves to “alleviat[e] . . . hardship 
by providing an opportunity to review orders of the trial court before they 
irreparably modify the rights of the litigants.”203 Second, an immediate 
appeal allows appellate courts to perform a critical function in the 
“development of the law by providing a mechanism for resolving conflicts 
among trial courts on issues not normally open on final appeal.”204 Third, 
an immediate appeal avoids the “waste of trial court time by providing an 
opportunity to review orders before they result in fruitless litigation and 
wasted expense.”205 
These broad purposes of both the collateral order doctrine and the 
appellate court system as a whole cannot be furthered by the Court’s strict 
confinement of the doctrine by handicapping itself to expansion only 
through the formal rulemaking process. These broad purposes, however, 
can be fulfilled if the Court reinvents the collateral order doctrine by 
effectuating Congress’s true intent in granting the Court rulemaking 
authority. Congress did not intend to handicap the Court; rather, Congress 
intended to empower the Court with an alternative armament to be used 
alongside the Court’s judicial decision-making power to expand the list of 
immediately appealable non-final orders. But rather than burden itself with 
the task of formulating bright-line rules governing which broad class of 
non-final orders are immediately appealable, the Court should entrust the 
lower courts with this task by providing a workable, flexible standard to 
apply when analyzing applications for appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine. 
 
 
 201. Settlement agreements are unappealable, so to the extent such interlocutory decisions are 
used by litigants to work toward settlement they have the effect of achieving finality without 
qualifying as an appealable final judgment. See id. at 1240–41.  
 202. See id. 
 203. Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 607, 609 (1975). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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The collateral order doctrine has its roots in the formulaic Cohen 
conditions in which a non-final order, must conclusively determine the 
disputed question, be important and separate from the merits, and be 
effectively unreviewable after final judgment in order to qualify for 
immediate appealability.
206
 Since Cohen, however, the Court has altered 
Cohen and the collateral order doctrine by incorporating two additional 
requirements. First, in Lauro Lines, the Court included a separate 
requirement that the issue be sufficiently “important” to warrant an 
immediate appeal.
207
 And, most recently in Mohawk Industries, the Court 
imposed the requirement that there be no conceivable alternatives to a 
collateral order appeal available to the litigant.
208
 While the Court 
purported to analyze whether a non-final order qualified as an immediately 
appealable collateral order by mechanically applying the formulaic Cohen 
conditions, the Court, in fact, was already conducting the flexible test 
advocated in this Note.
209
 
In an early rebuke of the collateral order doctrine as the “New 
‘Serbonian Bog,’” Lloyd C. Anderson argued that the “formulaic approach 
is a fiction” and that the Court’s “wildly inconsistent” approach to 
determining what non-final orders qualify as immediately appealable is 
better explained by acknowledging that the “Court in fact employs a 
flexible test rather than a formula of set conditions.”210 For example, in 
Mohawk Industries, although Justice Sotomayor principally refused to 
expand the collateral order doctrine through judicial decision-making, she 
did conduct a full Cohen analysis, in which she invoked elements of a 
more flexible cost-benefit analysis.
211
 Although effectively irrelevant 
because the Court was never going to include non-final disclosure orders 
 
 
 206. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). See also discussion supra 
Part I.B. 
 207. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502–03 (1989); Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867–68 (1994). See also discussion supra Part I.C. 
 208. Mohawk Indus., Inc., v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 109 (2009). See also discussion supra Part 
II.B. 
 209. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 608 (contending that the Court’s purported formulaic 
application of the Cohen conditions is a “fiction,” in which “an order must satisfy a given set of stated 
conditions—separate from the merits, unreviewable after final judgment, and conclusive 
determination—and if any one condition is not satisfied, an appeal must await final judgment. This 
formulaic approach is a fiction because the set conditions do not exist in fact.”). 
 210. See id. at 608–09 (“For example, the Court has ordained appeals that are enmeshed in the 
merits where there has been a significant risk of harm to interests deemed sufficiently important, but 
not where the asserted interest, although separate from the merits, is deemed insufficiently important 
to the litigant.”). 
   211. See Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 112 (weighing the “limited benefits” of authorizing a 
collateral order appeal in this particular instance against the “likely institutional costs” of doing so). 
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in the list of immediately appealable collateral orders, Justice Sotomayor 
did conclude that “the limited benefits of applying ‘the blunt, categorical 
instrument of Section 1291 collateral order appeal’ to privilege-related 
disclosure orders simply cannot justify the likely institutional costs.”212 In 
effect, Justice Sotomayor, in her application of the Cohen analysis, 
actually invoked a cost-benefit balancing approach. 
Justice Sotomayor’s application of the Cohen analysis is similar to the 
justification the Advisory Committee put forth in its committee note 
accompanying Rule 23(f). There the committee relied on a simple 
cost-benefit analysis showing that the identified concerns can be “met at 
low cost” if appellate courts have discretionary power to allow immediate 
appeals “in cases that show appeal-worthy certification issues.”213 Judge 
Easterbrook also used this cost-benefit approach in articulating a standard 
to review applications for immediate appeals under Rule 23(f), in which 
he suggested taking a two-fold approach—considering both the irreparable 
harm to the parties and the likelihood of the appeal’s success. More 
specifically, Judge Easterbrook first embraced the discretionary nature of 
the court’s review, noting that “[n]either a bright-line approach nor a 
catalog of factors would serve well” in the court’s determination of 
whether the appeal should be granted.
214
 Instead, he suggested a 
case-by-case approach, focusing on whether the “denial of class status 
seems likely to be fatal” and, if so, whether the “plaintiff has a solid 
argument in opposition to the district court’s decision.”215  
Taken together, the committee note accompanying Rule 23(f) 
combined with Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Mohawk Industries and 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in the Seventh Circuit, indicate that a flexible 
approach, utilizing a simple cost-benefit analysis, is a low-cost method of 
addressing trial court errors and determining which non-final orders 
should qualify as immediately appealable collateral orders. When viewed 
in this light, the Court’s reinvention of the collateral order doctrine is not 
as revolutionary as it may sound. Rather, the reinvention is merely an open 
recognition of a flexible standard already employed by the lower courts, 
the rulemaking authorities, and the Court itself. 
 
 
 212. Id. (quoting Digital, 511 U.S. at 883). 
 213. Committee Note, supra note 168, at 565. 
 214. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 215. Id. Judge Easterbrook also instructed that “if the ruling is impervious to revision there’s no 
point to an interlocutory appeal.” Id. at 835. The court also acknowledged that an application for 
immediate appeal would be more likely to succeed if the appeal “may facilitate the development of the 
law.” Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
“Each Chief Justice of the United States makes his mark on his Court, 
leading different jurisprudential projects and agendas, and moving and 
developing the law in some area.”216 To the extent that “civil procedure 
and the Federal Rules comprise a significant part of the Roberts Court's 
emerging jurisprudential agenda,” the civil procedure revival under the 
Roberts Court could not only be its legacy, but it could also dramatically 
shift the procedural landscape for future litigation.
217
 True to form, the 
Roberts Court has issued important decisions determining the scope of the 
collateral order doctrine and strictly confining the list of immediately 
appealable non-final orders to its pre-Roberts Court era extent. The Court 
has effectuated its stranglehold on the collateral order doctrine by invoking 
its rulemaking authority granted by Congress as an impenetrable shield to 
creative appellate litigator’s novel attempts to expand the contours of the 
doctrine. Rather than give effect to Congress’s intent behind granting the 
Court rulemaking authority—to revise its finality jurisprudence while 
expanding the list of immediately appealable non-final orders—the Court 
misinterpreted Congress’s actions as a limit on their authority. As a result, 
the Roberts Court has made its mark on the collateral order doctrine by 
shutting its doors to its own judicial invention and delegating future 
responsibility for the doctrine to the formal rulemaking bodies. 
While the rulemaking process can be used to expand the contours of 
the collateral order doctrine, the codification story of Rule 23(f) also 
provides evidence against sole reliance on the rulemaking process to 
expand the collateral order doctrine. To achieve the broad purposes behind 
allowing immediate appeals of non-final orders, and the goals of the 
appellate court system as a whole, the Roberts Court should revisit its 
interpretation of the rulemaking authority granted to it by Congress. In 
doing so, the Court should effectuate Congress’s stated intent by 
recognizing that the rulemaking authority is a supplement to the Court’s 
judicial decision-making power to determine the scope of the collateral 
order doctrine. Instead of using its rulemaking authority as a shield, 
defying both legislative directives and prudential concerns, the Court 
 
 
 216. Wasserman, supra note 1, at 313. 
 217. Id. at 316. 
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should articulate a more flexible, balanced approach to the Cohen 
conditions and the collateral doctrine as a whole. 
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